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THE SURETY'S LIABILITY FOR "BAD
FAITH": CLAIMS FOR EXTRA-
CONTRACTUAL DAMAGES BY AN
OBLIGEE UNDER THE PAYMENT
BOND
John J. Aromando*
Go with me to a notary, seal me there
Your single bond, and (in a merry sport)
If you repay me not on such a day
In such a place, such sum or sums as are
Express'd in the condition, let the forfeit
Be nominated for an equal pound
Of your fair flesh, to be cut off and taken
In what part of your body pleaseth me.1
I. INTRODUCTION
The theory of "bad faith" is by now well established in the areas
of liability and casualty insurance. Although the relief available
takes different forms in different jurisdictions, a common thread is
the exposure of the insurance carrier to extra-contractual damages
as a result of its conduct in handling a claim.
Depending on the jurisdiction, these extra-contractual damages
can include one or more of the following: penal interest and attor-
neys' fees; consequential damages for breach of contract; and recov-
ery in tort. Even in the most restrictive jurisdiction the exposure is
substantial, and in the most expansive it can be catastrophic. The
impact of such potential liability is not unlike that of a claim for
punitive damages, but without the procedural and substantive safe-
guards2 in place for exemplary awards.3 A bad faith claim raises the
stakes considerably.
* John J. Aromando is a partner in the Portland, Maine law firm of Pierce,
Atwood, Scribner, Allen, Smith & Lancaster, where he has a general civil trial
practice. He represents sureties, insurers, and contractors on a variety of fidelity,
surety, and construction matters.
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THm MERCHANT OF VENICE act I, sc. 3, lines 140-47
(Harvard Univ. Press 1955) (7th ed. 1598).
2. For instance, under Maine law, punitive damages may be awarded only for
conduct rising to the level of malice, proved by clear and convincing evidence. flt-
tle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1360-64 (Me. 1985).
3. Unless, of course, there is a claim for punitive damages in a jurisdiction that
allows recovery in tort for bad faith, to which any such available procedural and
substantive safeguards would apply.
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The purpose of this Article is to examine the exposure of the con-
struction surety to a claimant under a payment bond for extra-con-
tractual damages as a result of "bad faith." Reported decisions
involving bad faith claims against sureties, as opposed to liability
and casualty insurers, are fewer in number, and are divided as to the
surety's liability.
This Article focuses on the law of Maine concerning bad faith,
and its applicability to the payment bond surety. It also discusses
reported state and federal decisions from other jurisdictions that
specifically address the payment bond surety's liability for bad faith.
Finally, it considers the impact of the federal Miller Ace on such
claims, where applicable.
It is the conclusion of this Article that under Maine law, as well as
the law of other jurisdictions where analogous, a surety is not liable
to a payment bond claimant for extra-contractual damages for bad
faith. There are several reasons for this conclusion.
First, there are critical distinctions between this type of suretyship
relationship and the relationship between a liability or casualty car-
rier and its insured, which undercut the usual basis for such liability.
Although some courts are giving less import to historical distinctions
between suretyship and insurance in general, the distinction be-
tween a first-party versus a third-party relationship remains vital in
the area of bad faith. The interaction between a surety and a pay-
ment bond claimant is closer to a third-party insurance claim, for
which under Maine law no bad faith remedy exists.6
To conclude otherwise places the payment bond surety in a no-
win predicament in the event of competing demands between the
bond claimant and the bond principal concerning payment under
the bond, a not uncommon situation. It would leave the surety with
the difficult if not impossible task of discharging simultaneous obli-
gations of good faith to parties in an adversarial relationship.7 It
would ignore the fact that, at its core, the relationship between the
surety and the bond claimant is adversary in nature.
4. 40 U.S.C. §§ 270a-270f (1988).
5. See infra notes 56-92 and accompanying text.
6. Linscott v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 368 A.2d 1161, 1163-64 (Me. 1977).
7. It would be impossible to conclude that the surety owed a duty of good faith to
the payment bond claimant without finding a similar duty to the bond principal, who
actually has a first-party contractual relationship with the surety. That relationship
usually includes not only the bond, but also an agreement by the principal to indem-
nify the surety for losses suffered under the bond, the enforcement of which is a
matter of obvious concern to the surety in responding to claims by third-party obli-
gees against the bond. That accounts for the Hobson's choice that such competing
good faith obligations would create. See United States ex reL Ehmcke Sheet Metal
Works v. Wausau Ins. Cos., 755 F. Supp. 906,911 (E.D. Cal. 1991) ("[Permitting the
subcontractor to sue the surety for bad faith would also create an unresolvable con-
ffict of interest for the surety.").
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Second, efforts to establish the surety's bad faith liability to the
payment bond claimant under a third-party beneficiary analysis are
unpersuasive. Although the obligee is an intended beneficiary of
the payment bond,' that intent extends only to obligations explicit in
the bond, which by definition do not include liability for extra-con-
tractual damages.9 Under Maine law, except for contracts governed
by the Uniform Commercial Code, a direct contractual relationship
equivalent to a first-party insurance relationship is necessary to give
rise to the implied covenant on which "bad faith" liability is based. 10
Third, although the Maine Insurance Code" includes suretyship
and the surety within its definitions of "insurance" 2 and "in-
surer,"'13 specific statutory remedies available under the Code for
late payment' 4 and for unfair claims practices' 5 are limited by their
explicit language to claims arising out of the relationship between an
"insured" and "his own insurer." As with the common law remedy,
a direct first-party contractual relationship is a prerequisite to
recovery.
Finally, on construction projects where the Miller Act applies,
that federal statute should preempt any state law claim against the
payment bond surety for extra-contractual damages. Although
there is a split of authority on that issue nationally, the better rea-
soned view eschews an approach that subjects the Miller Act surety
to a multiplicity of potential exposures under its payment bond, de-
pendent only on in what state the bonded project happens to be
located.
II. THE PAYMENT BOND RELATIONSHIP
The payment bond is an instrument where a surety on behalf of its
principal, the general contractor or a subcontractor, guarantees the
payment of third parties, the obligees, for labor, materials, or equip-
8. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF SECURITY § 165 (1941).
9. See infra note 102 and accompanying text..
10. "[T]here is no general implied duty of good faith under Maine law that oper-
ates beyond the scope of the mandate of the Maine U.C.C. and the contractual rela-
tionship between an insurer and its insured on a policy of casualty insurance."
Renaissance Yacht Co. v. Stenbeck, 818 F. Supp. 407, 412 (D. Me. 1993) (citing
Diversified Foods, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 605 A.2d 609, 613 (Me. 1992)
and First NH Banks Granite State v. Scarborough, 615 A.2d 248, 250-51 (Me.
1992)). Cf Top of the 7Track Ass'n v. Lewiston Raceways, Inc., No. AND-94-431,
1995 WL 87493, at *3 (Me. Feb. 23, 1995) (Maine law does recognize an implied
covenant in any first-party contract where "it is absolutely necessary to introduce
the term to effectuate the intention of the parties.") (quoting 11 WiLtsroN ON CON.
TRACTS § 1295 (1968)).
11. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A §§ 1-6226 (West 1990 & Supp. 1994-1995).
12. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 3 (West 1990).
13. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 4 (West 1990).
14. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2436 (West 1990).
15. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2436-A (West 1990).
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ment furnished by them in connection with a particular construction
project. In the event such labor, materials, and equipment are paid
for in full as contracted, the obligation of the bond becomes void;
otherwise, it remains in force and may be sued on directly by those
obligees subject to the conditions stated therein.
On projects of a requisite dollar amount where the federal or
state government is the owner, the general contractor is required to
furnish a payment bond by statute. The federal statute is known as
the Miller Act' 6 and analogous state laws are referred to as "Little
Miller Acts."' 7 The purpose of these statutes is to substitute the
payment bond's security for the mechanic's lien remedy normally
available to contractors and suppliers under state law,'" because
government property is not subject to liens.' 9
Although not required by law, payment bonds are used on private
projects as well. The principal furnishes the payment bond in satis-
faction of its contract with the owner or general contractor to per-
form the work or a certain portion of the work. Again, the bond
serves as substitute security to help protect the owner's property
under construction or improvement, which on a private project is
subject to the mechanic's lien remedy.
In the usual arrangement, the surety agrees to furnish the pay-
ment bond in exchange for consideration from the principal, and the
principal in turn agrees to indemnify the surety from losses under
that bond. There is no first-party contractual relationship between
the surety and the payment bond's obligees. Usually, the obligees
are not named in the bond specifically, but are described generally
as those furnishing labor, materials, or equipment to the bond prin-
cipal or its subcontractors in connection with the project.
The surety's total liability to claimants under the payment bond is
limited to the penal sum stated therein.' "The obligation is strictis-
16. 40 U.S.C. § 270a (1988).
17. See, e.g., Mn. RFv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 871 (West 1980 & Supp. 1994-1995)
(Maine's Public Works Surety Bond Law of 1971, also known as Maine's "Little
Miller Act").
18. In Maine, the mechanic's lien remedy is codified at M. Rnv. STAT. ANN. tit.
10, §§ 3251-3264 (West 1980 & Supp. 1994-1995).
19. See F. D. Rich Co. v. United States ex reL Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116,
122 (1974); United States ex reL Ehmcke Sheet Metal Works v. Wausau Ins. Cos.,
755 F. Supp. 906, 908-09 (E.D. Cal. 1991); but see Me. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§ 3251 (West Supp. 1994-1995) (mechanic's lien remedy in Maine is available against
"any public building erected or owned by any city, town, school district or other
municipal corporation").
20. See, e.g., United States v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 817 F.2d 956,963 (2d Cir.) ("It is
hornbook law that a surety is liable up to, and only up to, the limit on the bond it
issued."), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 855 (1987); Amfac Mortgage Corp. v. Arizona Mall
of Tempe, Inc., 583 F.2d 426,435 (9th Cir. 1978) (noting the "general rule that the
liability of the surety is limited to the express terms of the surety contract"); Bill
Curphy Co. v. Elliott, 207 F.2d 103, 106 (5th Cir. 1953) ("[T]he sole object of stating
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simi juris; that is, he has consented to be bound only within the ex-
press terms of his contract and his liability must be found within that
contract or not at all. ' 21
III. BAD FAITH LIABILITY UNDER MAINE LAW
The question of a surety's liability for extra-contractual damages
for bad faith has yet to be addressed in Maine. Both the Maine
Supreme Judicial Court ("the Law Court") and the United States
District Court for the District of Maine, however, have addressed in
other contexts the scope of bad faith liability under Maine law. In
Maine, there is both a common law and a statutory basis for such
liability.
A. Common Law Liability
The Law Court has held "that in every insurance contract an in-
surer owes a duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with its insured
.... 22 This duty is an implied covenant, which "arises at the time
the parties enter into the insurance contract. '23 "[T]he obligation is
imposed by the parties themselves and is woven within the fabric of
their contractual relationship."'24
The Law Court has specifically rejected, on the other hand, the
proposition that an insurer bears any such good faith obligation to-
ward a third-party claimant under a liability policy.2 5 The Law
Court has described the relationship between the insurer and the
the penalty in a bond is to fix the limit of the liability of the signers, and no recovery
can be had on such bond against the principal or surety beyond the penalty named in
the bond."); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Alford, 111 F.2d 388, 390-91 (10th Cir.)
("Under the great weight of authority, a surety's liability is limited by the penal sum
named in the bond .... ), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 668 (1940); Massachusetts Bonding
& Ins. Co. v. United States, 97 F.2d 879, 881 (9th Cir. 1938) ("It is fundamental in
the law of suretyship that a bondsman cannot be held for any default of his principal
in an amount greater than the penal sum of the bond."); Wayne Rosa Const. v. Hugo
Key & Son, Inc., 153 F.R.D. 481, 484 (D. Me. 1994) ("Connecticut Indemnity's lia-
bility is fixed at the amount of the penal sum in the surety bond."); Pennsylvania
Fire Ins. Co. v. American Airlines, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 239,241 (E.D.N.Y. 1960) ("It is
fundamental and long settled that a surety's obligation is limited to the face amount
of the bond."); American Sur. Co. of New York v. Lawrenceville Cement Co., 110 F.
717, 725 (C.C.D. Me. 1901) (holding surety liable for interest on claims only up to
penal sum of bond).
21. United States ex rel Ehmcke Sheet Metal Works v. Wausau Ins. Cos., 755 F.
Supp. at 911-12 (quoting Goggin v. Reliance Ins. Co., 19 Cal. Rptr. 446,448 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1962)).
22. Marquis v. Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co., 628 A.2d 644, 648 (Me. 1993).
23. Id. at 647-48, 652. See also Linscott v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 368
A.2d at 1163.
24. Marquis v. Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co., 628 A.2d at 652 (quoting McCullough
v. Golden Rule Ins. Co., 789 P.2d 855, 864 (Wyo. 1990) (Golden, J., dissenting)).
25. Linscott v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 368 A.2d at 1163-64.
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third-party claimant as essentially "adversary in nature."' The im-
plied "'duty of good faith and fair dealing' in the handling of insur-
ance claims" is limited in its application to the actual parties to the
insurance contract.27
Beyond the first-party insurance situation, Maine law recognizes
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing only where re-
quired by the Maine Uniform Commercial Code.28 Maine does not
"recognize the existence of such an implied duty as a matter of gen-
eral applicability" to all contractual relationships, despite the fact
that "[s]uch was, and is, the majority rule, and that rule is supported,
if not based upon, the adoption of such a duty by both the Uniform
Commercial Code and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205(1979). ' 2
Damages recoverable for breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing in Maine, where available, are limited to "the
traditional remedies for breach of contract."30 The Law Court has
"expressly refuse[d] to recognize an independent tort of bad faith
resulting from an insurer's breach of its duty to act in good faith and
deal fairly with an insured.' Such "traditional" contract remedies
include "full general and consequential damages"' 2 and can exceed
the value of the contract itself33 by a potentially wide margin. '
26. Id. at 1163.
27. Id. See also Marquis v. Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co., 628 A.2d at 648, 652.
28. Renaissance Yacht Co. v. Stenbeck, 818 F. Supp. 407, 412 (D. Me. 1993);
People's Heritage Say. Bank v. Recoil Management, 814 F. Supp. 159, 169 & n.17
(D. Me. 1993); First NH Banks Granite State v. Scarborough, 615 A.2d 248, 250-51
(Me. 1992); Diversified Foods, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 605 A.2d 609. 613-
14 (Me. 1992).
29. Renaissance Yacht Co., Inc. v. Stenbeck, 818 F. Supp. at 411. The Law Court
recently held that Maine law does recognize implied covenants in contracts where
.not inconsistent with some express term of the contract" and where "absolutely
necessary... to effectuate the intention of the parties." Top of the Track Ass'n v.
Lewiston Raceways, Inc., No. AND-94-431, 1995 WL 87493, at 03 (Me. Feb. 23,
1995). The court explicitly noted, however, that this holding is not tantamount to
recognition of a general implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in all contracts
under Maine law. As stated by the court: "Partly because of the influence of the
Uniform Commercial Code, some courts have begun to talk of 'good faith' rather
than 'implied covenants.' To date, we have not adopted this approach." Id. at 04
n2.
30. Marquis v. Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co., 628 A.2d at 652.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. The value of the contract being the limit of liability under an insurance policy,
or the penal sum in the event of a bond.
34. In the Marquis case, the plaintiffs brought suit against Farm Family for its
failure to pay under two policies with total combined limits of liability of $77,000 and
obtained a judgment for $680,000, which included consequential damages for lost
profits of $610,629. Marquis v. Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co., 628 A.2d at 646-47, 650-
51.
MAINE LAW REVIEW
B. Statutory Liability
The Maine Insurance Code35 contains two provisions, sections
2436 and 2436-A, that create a private cause of action against an
"insurer" for extra-contractual damages arising out of the insurer's
conduct in handling a claim. Both permit the recovery of attorneys'
fees and interest at eighteen percent per annum. Because these stat-
utes are penal in nature, they are strictly construed. 6
1. Maine Insurance Code Section 2436
Section 2436 deals with late payment of claims.3 7 It provides a
thirty-day window for response to "[a] claim for payment of benefits
under a policy of insurance against loss delivered or issued for deliv-
ery within this State."'38 The statute provides an exception if, during
the original thirty days, the insurer notifies the insured in writing
that "reasonable additional information is required," in which case
35. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A §§ 1-6226 (West 1990 & Supp. 1994-1995).
36. Seabury Hous. Assocs. v. Home Ins. Co., 695 F. Supp. 1244, 1248 & n.6 (D.
Me. 1988) (citing Depositors Trust Co. v. Farm Family Life Ins. Co., 445 A.2d 1014
(Me. 1982)); Marquis v. Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co., 628 A.2d at 651-52; Burne v.
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 403 A.2d 775, 777 (Me. 1979).
37.
Late Payment
1. A claim for payment of benefits under a policy of insurance against loss
delivered or issued for delivery within this State is payable within 30 days
after proof of loss is received by the insurer and ascertainment of the loss is
made either by written agreement between the insurer and the insured or
by filing with the insured of an award by arbitrators as provided for in the
policy, and a claim which is neither disputed nor paid within 30 days is
overdue, provided that if during the 30 days the insurer, in writing, notifies
the insured that reasonable additional information is required, the undis-
puted claim shall not be overdue until 30 days following receipt by the
insurer of the additional required information; except that the time period
applicable to a standard fire policy and to that portion of a policy providing
a combination of coverages, as described in section 3003, insuring against
the peril of fire shall be 60 days, as provided in section 3002.
2. An insurer may dispute a claim by furnishing to the insured, or his
representative, a written statement that the claim is disputed with a state-
ment of the grounds upon which it is disputed.
3. If an insurer fails to pay an undisputed claim or any undisputed part of
the claim when due, the amount of the overdue claim or part of the claim
shall bear interest at the rate of 11h% per month after the due date.
4. A reasonable attorneys fee for advising and representing a claimant on
an overdue claim or action for an overdue claim shall be paid by the in-
surer if overdue benefits are recovered in an action against the insurer or if
overdue benefits are paid after receipt of notice of the attorney's
representation.
5. Nothing in this section prohibits or limits any claim or action for a
claim which the claimant has against the insurer.
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2436 (West 1990).
38. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2436(1) (West 1990). Sixty days are al-
lowed for a response to a claim under a fire policy. Id.
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the thirty-day period to pay or dispute the claim is tolled until re-
ceipt by the insurer of the additional required information.39
If the insurer fails to pay an undisputed claim or any undisputed
part of a claim when due under section 2436, the statute provides for
recovery of interest on the overdue amount at 11h% per monthplus
a reasonable attorneys' fee in the event the claimant prevails.4°
Section 2436 does not require "good faith" per se, and the Law
Court has "decline[d] to imply such a condition., 41 The insurer is
not liable for interest and attorneys' fees under this statute so long
as it "technically complie[s]" with its deadlines. 42
The explicit language of section 2436 makes it clear that this rem-
edy is available to an "insured" only for late payment of a first-party
claim presented to its own insurer. The Statement of Fact for the
original version of section 2436, enacted in 1973,43 provided that
"[t]he purpose of the new draft is to limit the bill to claims for first-
party coverage."'  Although the language of the statute was re-
pealed and replaced in 1977,41 the Law Court has held that those
amendments did not change "that basic limitation," and that the
current version of section 2436 therefore applies to first-party casu-
alty insurance only, and not, for instance, to a claim by a third-party
beneficiary under a life insurance policy.'
2. Maine Insurance Code Section 2436-A
Section 2436-A deals with unfair claim practices.47 It sets forth
"four separate bases for an award of statutory interest and attorneys
39. Id.
40. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2436(3)-2436(4) (Vest 1990).
41. Marquis v. Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co., 628 A.2d at 651.
42. Id.
43. P.L. 1973, ch. 480.
44. Depositors Trust Co. v. Farm Family Life Ins. Co., 445 A2d at 1018.
45. P.L. 1977, ch. 357.
46. Depositors Trust Co. v. Farm Family Life Ins. Co., 445 A.2d at 1017-18 & n.4.
Section 2436 was amended again in 1987, P.L. 1987, ch. 344, however less exten-
sively, and not in a manner that would extend its application beyond first-part casu-
alty insurance claims.
47.
Unfair Claims Practices
1. Civil Actions. Any person injured by any of the following actions
taken by his own insurer may bring a civil action and recover damages,
together with costs and disbursements, reasonable attorneys fees and inter-
est on damages at the rate of 11h% per month:
A. Knowingly misrepresenting to an insured pertinent facts of the
policy provisions relating to coverage at issue;
B. Failing to acknowledge and review claims, which may include pay-
ment or denial of a claim, within a reasonable time following receipt of
written notice by the insurer of a claim by an insured arising under a
policy;
MAINE LAW REVIEW
fees."'48 The plaintiff must "allege and prove a specific violation" of
one of those four bases in order to recover.49
Section 2436-A "reflect[s] a legislative intent that bad faith insur-
ance claims be addressed and remedied within statutory guide-
lines."5 "Allowing, in addition [to sections 2436 and 2436-A], an.
independent tort action in cases such as this 'might well thwart the
legislature's intent to craft a comprehensive insurance code, and
could subject insurance companies to multiple and inconsistent
liability.' "51
A cause of action under section 2436-A will lie only by an "in-
sured" against "his own insurer. '52 The statute explicitly excludes
health, life, and workers' compensation insurance.5 3 It is therefore
clear that Section 2436-A applies only to first-party casualty
insurance.5
4
IV. DECISIONS ON THE LIABILITY OF THE SURETY TO THE
PAYMENT BOND CLAIMANT FOR EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL
DAMAGES FOR BAD FAITH
Both the Law Court and the United States District Court for the
District of Maine have yet to confront in a reported decision the
question of the surety's liability to a payment bond claimant for ex-
tra-contractual damages. There have been a number of recent re-
ported cases on this issue in other jurisdictions, however. 5 These
authorities are split as to the surety's liability. Although it is diffi-
cult to ascertain any clear trend nationwide, decisions finding that
the surety may be liable for such extra-contractual damages are
clearly more than an aberrant minority.
C. Threatening to appeal from an arbitration award in favor of an
insured for the sole purpose of compelling the insured to accept a set-
tlement less than the arbitration award; or
D. Failing to affirm coverage, reserving any appropriate defenses, or
deny coverage within a reasonable time after completed proof of loss
forms have been received by the insurer.
2. Application. This section does not apply to health or life insurance or
workers' compensation claims.
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2436-A (West 1990).
48. Marquis v. Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co., 628 A.2d at 651-52.
49. Id.
50. Seabury Hous. Assocs. v. Home Ins. Co., 695 F. Supp. at 1249.
51. Marquis v. Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co., 628 A.2d at 652 (quoting Seabury
Hous. Assocs. v. Home Ins. Co., 695 F. Supp. at 1249).
52. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2436-A(1) (West 1990).
53. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2436-A(2) (West 1990).
54. See Depositors Trust Co. v. Farm Family Life Ins. Co., 445 A.2d at 1017-18 &
n.4; Seabury Hous. Assocs. v. Home Ins. Co., 695 F. Supp. at 1249.
55. See Bernard L. Balkin & Keith Witten, Current Developments in Bad Faith
Litigation Involving the Performance and Payment Bond Surety, 28 TORT & INS. L.J.
611 (1993).
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In order to divine the likely determination of this issue under
Maine law, it is useful to examine the grounds for these decisions
from other jurisdictions, and to compare their rationale to existing
Maine law in the area of "bad faith" in general.
A. The Surety as Insurer
Suretyship is not insurance.56 The contrary conclusion, however,
provides the cornerstone for decisions that recognize the exposure
of the surety to the payment bond claimant for extra-contractual
damages for bad faith.
The erosion of the relevance of the distinctions between surety-
ship and insurance can be traced in part to the 1984 decision of the
Ohio Supreme Court in Suver v. Personal Service Insurance Co.5
Suver involved not a payment bond claim, but a claim by an injured
third-party motorist against the surety on a financial responsibility
bond for "the malicious and willful failure to pay the amount of the
bond.""8
The court in Suver began its discussion of the legal issue with the
following acknowledgment: "It is true that a financial responsibility
bond is not the same as an insurance policy and that a surety is not
an insurer and may therefore act in its own interest."59 From that
venerable truism, however, the court, without citation to authority,
leapt to the following conclusion: "These differences are not so pro-
nounced as to require the creation of a cause of action in one case
and its denial in the other., 60
The Suver court held, therefore, that under the common law of
Ohio, the surety on a financial responsibility bond is liable in tort,
including punitive damages, if "guilty of actual malice, fraud or op-
pression," for breach of the "duty to act in good faith in the han-
dling and payment of claims by one who may be injured by the
principal., 61
The Suver case has been cited in other jurisdictions to support the
same treatment of the construction surety.62 As formulated by the
56. For a discussion of distinctions between suretyship and insurance in the con-
text of "bad faith," see B. C. Hart, Bad Faith Litigation Against Sureties, 24 TORT &
INS. LJ. 18 (1988).
57. 462 N.E.2d 415 (Ohio 1984).
58. Id. at 416.
59. Id. at 417 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See Dodge v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 778 P.2d 1240, 1243 (Ariz.
1989); Loyal Order of Moose, Lodge 1392 v. International Fidelity Ins. Co., 797 P.2d
622, 627 n.8 (Alaska 1990). Although the holdings of both of these cases are limited
to a claim by an obligee under a performance bond, both courts in dictum indicated
that they would reach the same result with respect to the claim of an obligee under a
payment bond. Dodge v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 778 P.2d at 1243
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Supreme Court of Arizona in Dodge v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of
Maryland, the issue can be reduced to the following "simple"
calculus:
Plaintiffs' position is simple: sureties are insurers; insurers are
subject to bad faith tort liability; therefore, sureties are subject
to bad faith tort liability. The court of appeals rejected this
syllogism as "too simplistic." Although simple, this proposi-
tion is supported by our statutes, case law and sound policy
reasons.
6
Dodge made explicit reference to Suver as a case where "[s]imilar
policy considerations were determinative."'
Closer examination does not bear this similarity out, however.
Even if one accepts the logic of the Suver decision in the area of the
financial responsibility bond,65 its rationale is not so readily transfer-
able to the construction surety.
Although it cited no legal authority for its dismissal of the histori-
cal distinctions between liability insurance and suretyship in the area
of the financial responsibility bond, the Suver court did state three
"policy arguments" it found to be "[p]recisely the same... in both
settings."66
First, "[i]n both cases there is a great disparity of financial re-
sources." 67 The obligee of the financial responsibility bond is an in-
jured motorist, an individual comparable in means to a first-party
consumer of personal liability or casualty insurance. 68 The obligee
("The same is true with construction performance bonds and other types of surety
insurance."); Loyal Order of Moose, Lodge 1392 v. International Fidelity Ins. Co.,
797 P.2d at 626 ("We conclude that an implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing exists between a surety and its obligee on payment and performance bonds.").
For more recent decisions adhering to the traditional distinctions between surety-
ship and insurance, however, see United States ex reL Ehmcke Sheet Metal Works v.
Wausau Ins. Cos., 755 F. Supp. 906, 913 (E.D. Cal. 1991), and Blakeslee Arpaia
Chapman, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., No. 520348, 1994 WL 76383,
slip op. at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 4, 1994).
63. Dodge v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 778 P.2d at 1241 (citation
omitted).
64. 1& at 1243.
65. Such acceptance is by no means a foregone conclusion. See infra notes 71,
75-83 and accompanying text.
66. Suver v. Personal Serv. Ins. Co., 462 N.E.2d at 417.
67. Id.
68. The better analogy is between the obligee under the financial responsibility
bond and the third-party tort claimant under the automobile liability insurance pol-
icy. The distinction between first-party and third-party claimants, although over-
looked by the Suver majority, is critical to liability for bad faith. Id. at 418 (Holmes,
J., dissenting); Linscott v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 368 A.2d 1161, 1163-64
(Me. 1977). In the case of a personal automobile liability policy, however, it is fair to
say that, for both the first-party and the third-party claimant, there is likely to be a
"great disparity of financial resources" as compared to the insurance carrier.
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on a payment bond, on the other hand, is usually a commercial en-
tity with resources more comparable to that of the surety.69
Second, the Suver court found that "issuers of financial responsi-
bility bonds are companies clearly affected with a public interest. 70
That public interest is "the protection of the motoring public." 7'
There is no comparable "public interest" with respect to a payment
bond.
Although required by statute in some instances, I the purpose of
the payment bond is simply to serve as substitute security for the
mechanic's lien.73 The aggrieved subcontractor or supplier has no
bad faith remedy for non-payment of its claim under the mechanic's
lien statute.74 Exposure of the surety to extra-contractual damages
is therefore unnecessary to accomplish the goal of giving the pay-
ment bond claimant similar substitute security.
Finally, the Suver court found a bad faith cause of action in tort
against the financial responsibility bond surety is necessary to dis-
courage "the routine denial of payment of claims for as long as pos-
sible." 75 To the extent such a premise is accepted, it would apply
equally to the payment bond surety. The experience in California,
69. See United States ex reL Ehmcke Sheet Metal Works v. Wausau Ins. Cos., 755
F. Supp. at 913 ("Here we deal with commercial entities fully prepared to protect
their own interests."); F. D. Rich Co. v. United States ex reL Indus. Lumber Co., 417
U.S. 116, 130 (1974) ("Miller Act suits are plain and simple commercial litigation.").
Interestingly, in Dodge v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 778 P.2d 1240
(Ariz. 1989), a leading case finding the construction surety liable for bad faith, the
plaintiffs, obligees under a performance bond, were residential homeowners rather
than a commercial enterprise. Id at 1241. The Dodge court found that '[the pur-
pose of the construction performance bond required by plaintiffs' contract with [the
general contractor] was not for plaintiffs' commercial advantage, but to protect
plaintiffs from calamity-[the contractor's] default on the contract." Id. at 1242. At
least one court has described both the Dodge and the Suver cases as decisions -ad-
her[ing] to the distinction between commercial and non-commercial entities."
United States ex reL Ehmcke Sheet Metal Works v. Wausau Ins. Cos., 755 F. Supp.
at 913 n.7.
70. Suver v. Personal Serv. Ins. Co., 462 N.E.2d at 417.
71. Id Maine's Financial Responsibility Law requires every operator or owner
of a motor vehicle in the State of Maine to maintain a minimum of S20.000$S40,000
of liability coverage for the protection of the motoring public. Ma. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 29-A, §§ 1601-1612 (West Supp. 1994-1995) (formerly Ma. R-v. STAT. ANN. tit.
29, §§ 780-A to 791). In contrast to the reasoning of the Suver court, Maine's statu-
tory requirement has not given rise to a duty of good faith toward its public benefi-
ciaries, third-party tort claimants. See Marquis v. Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co., 628
A.2d at 647-48, 652; Linscott v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 368 A.2d at 1163-64.
72. See supra notes 16-17 and infra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
73. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
74. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 3251 (West Supp. 1994-1995) ('Whoever
performs labor or furnishes labor or materials ... used in erecting, altering, moving
or repairing a house, building or appurtenances... by virtue of a contract with or by
consent of the owner, has a lien thereon and on the land on which it stands ... to
secure payment thereof, with costs.") (emphasis added).
75. Suver v. Personal Serv. Ins. Co., 462 N.E.2d at 417.
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however, where the Supreme Court in the 1979 decision of Royal
Globe Insurance Co. v. Superior Court76 pioneered the extension of
the bad faith remedy "to those not in privity of contract with the
insurer,",77 suggests an abundance of caution before such a premise
is accepted.
The California Supreme Court overruled Royal Globe nine years
later in the 1988 case of Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Insurance
Cos.78 Any concerns about "disparity of financial resources" and
"the routine denial of payment of claims for as long as possible" 79
were outweighed by a new set of greater problems created by the
remedy itself. The Moradi-Shalal court found that its earlier holding
in Royal Globe, extending a cause of action for bad faith to third-
party claimants, had the following adverse effects: (1) it
"promot[ed] multiple litigation"; (2) it "tend[ed] to encourage un-
warranted settlement demands by claimants, and to coerce inflated
settlements by insurers"; and (3) it created a potentially irreconcila-
ble conflict for the insurer, which "must not only protect the inter-
ests of its insured, but also must safeguard its own interests from the
adverse claims of the third party claimant." 80 These concerns ex-
pressed in Moradi-Shalal apply with equal if not greater force to
payment bond claims.81
In summary, of the three "policy arguments" cited by the Suver
court in support of its analogy between surety and insurer, two are
not transferable to the payment bond context and the third is dubi-
ous in its premise even in the insurance area where third-party
claimants are concerned. Suretyship is not insurance.8 More to the
point, the payment bond obligee is not a first-party insured. 3
76. 592 P.2d 329 (Cal. 1979).
77. United States ex rel. Ehmcke Sheet Metal Works v. Wausau Ins. Cos., 755 F.
Supp. at 910.
78. 758 P.2d 58 (Cal. 1988).
79. Suver v. Personal Serv. Ins. Co., 462 N.E.2d at 417.
80. Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 758 P.2d at 66-67.
81. United States ex rel Ehmcke Sheet Metal Works v. Wausau Ins. Cos., 755 F.
Supp. at 910-11.
82. See id. at 913 ("Yet although suretyship is sometimes treated as a form of
insurance, courts and commentators recognize that suretyship is different from lia-
bility insurance and has a distinct legal history.") (citations omitted); Blakeslee
Arpaia Chapman, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., No. 520348, 1994 WL
76383, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 4, 1994) ("A payment bond ... does not fit
within the definition of 'insurance,' nor does it constitute a contract or policy of
insurance.").
83. A majority of the Ohio Supreme Court in Suver v. Personal Serv. Ins. Co.,
462 N.E.2d at 416-17, as well as the Supreme Courts of Arizona and Alaska in
Dodge v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 778 P.2d at 1242-43, and Loyal Order
of Moose, Lodge 1392 v. International Fidelity Ins. Co., 797 P.2d at 626-28, all made
the leap from a prior decision finding a duty of good faith owed by an insurer to Its
own first-party insured to the same conclusion about a surety and the bond obligee,
without any substantive consideration of "whether the [obligee] should be viewed as
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B. State Insurance Codes
Some courts have found firmer footing for the analogy of surety-
ship to insurance in the insurance codes enacted by their state legis-
latures. These decisions rely on the inclusion of sureties and
suretyship within statutory definitions of insurer and insurance.'
As stated by the California Court of Appeal in General Insurance
Co. of America v. Mammoth Vista Owners Ass'n:
a first party or third party claimant." United States ex rel Ehmcke Sheet Metal
Works v. Wausau Ins. Cos., 755 F. Supp. at 913. The Moose Lodge court made this
leap in the face of its own prior decision just two years earlier "declin[ing] to recog-
nize a common-law tort duty of good faith and fair dealing running from an insurer
to an injured claimant absent a contractual relationship." Loyal Order of Moose,
Lodge 1392 v. International Fidelity Ins. Co., 797 P.2d at 627 n.7.
As stated on behalf of the two judges dissenting in Suver
[T]he imposition of the duty of good faith upon the insurer [is] justified
because of the relationship between the insurer and the insured. There [is]
obviously privity of contract and consideration flowing from both sides. In
my view, the contractual relationship between the parties [is] vital in estab-
lishing the duty on the insurer to act in good faith. I fail to see any rela-
tionship between the parties herein [surety and obligee] which was so vital
to [Hoskins v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 452 N.E.2d 1315 (Ohio 1983) (establish-
ing under Ohio law an insurer's "duty to act in good faith in payment of the
claims of its insured.")].
Suver v. Personal Serv. Ins. Co., 462 N.E.2d at 418 (Holmes, J., dissenting). See also
United States ex reL Ehmcke Sheet Metal Works v. Wausau Ins. Cos., 755 F. Supp.
at 912 ("[Tlhe California courts repeatedly have stressed that the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing arises from a contractual relationship and is limited to the
parties in that relationship."). The Ehncke Sheet Metal court also distinguished de-
cisions involving life insurance on the basis that "[t]hose cases simply do not discuss
whether the beneficiary should be viewed as a first party or third party claimant."
Id. at 913.
84. See Farmer's Union Cent. Exch. Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 626 F. Supp. 583,
590 (D.N.D. 1985); Dodge v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 778 P.2d at 1241-
42; K-W Indus. v. National Sur. Corp., 754 P.2d 502, 504-05 (Mont. 1988); Szarkow-
ski v. Reliance Ins. Co., 404 N.W.2d 502, 504-05 (N.D. 1987); General Ins. Co. of
America v. Mammoth Vista Owners Ass'n, 220 Cal. Rptr. 291,297-99 (Cal. Ct. App.
1985); cf Blakeslee Arpaia Chapman, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co.,
No. 520348, 1994 WL 76383, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 4, 1994) ("A payment
bond ... does not fit within the definition of 'insurance,' nor does it constitute a
contract or policy of insurance" under Connecticut's Unfair Insurance Practices
Act.").
The California Court of Appeal in Mammoth Vista held that "an obligee under a
surety bond may bring an action against its surety for engaging in unfair claims set-
tlement practices in violation of [the California] Insurance Code section 790.03, sub-
division (h)" because section 790.03(h) "is merely a codification of the tort of breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as applied to insurance,"
which "extends the cause of action to third party claimants." General Ins. Co. of
America v. Mammoth Vista Owners Ass'n, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 296-97, 300 (citing
Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 592 P.2d 329 (Cal. 1979)). In light of the
California Supreme Court's holding in Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos.,
758 P.2d 58 (Cal. 1988), overruling Royal Globe, the continuing viability of the hold-
ing of Mammoth Vista is doubtful. See United States ex rel Ehmcke Sheet Metal
Works v. Wausau Ins. Cos., 755 F. Supp. at 908 & n.3, 910-13.
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We recognize liability insurance is not identical in every re-
spect with suretyship. But we are not concerned with the dif-
ferences between suretyship and liability insurance. We are
concerned with whether the Legislature included suretyship
among the classes of businesses it intended to regulate under
the Insurance Code. It clearly did so.8
5
It is within the purview of the legislative process to regulate surety-
ship and, assuming a rational basis, even to alter the import of the
historical differences between suretyship and insurance.
The logic of these decisions breaks down, however, when the
courts start mixing pieces of the comprehensive statutory schemes of
their state insurance codes with the common law. Rather than judg-
ing the surety's exposure as an "insurer" under the express provi-
sions of the code,' these cases simply use the statutory definition of
surety as "insurer" as a jumping off point to clear the hurdle to com-
mon law bad faith liability otherwise imposed by the historical dis-
tinctions between suretyship and insurance.
The approach of the Montana Supreme Court in K-W Industries
v. National Surety Corp.87 is illustrative. In that case, the court be-
gan its discussion of the legal issue by noting that the surety Na-
tional "concedes in brief [sic] that if this Court refers only to the
statutes for determining whether National is an insurer under Mon-
tana law, there is little doubt that National surely would be desig-
nated as an insurer." From that point of departure, the K-W
Industries court reached the following destination:
85. General Ins. Co. of America v. Mammoth Vista Owners Ass'n, 220 Cal. Rptr.
at 298 (footnotes omitted). This language from Mammoth Vista has been either
quoted or cited with approval by the Supreme Courts of Arizona, Montana, and
North Dakota in Dodge v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 778 P.2d at 1242, K-
W Indus. v. National Sur. Corp., 754 P.2d at 504, and Szarkowski v. Reliance Ins.
Co., 404 N.W.2d at 504.
86. Some decisions refer to the issue as whether a private cause of action is "im-
plied" by the statute. See, eg., United States ex rel. Ehmcke Sheet Metal Works v.
Wausau Ins. Cos., 755 F. Supp. at 909 n.3 ("The court in [Mammoth Vista] based its
holding solely upon an implied private cause of action found in Cal.Ins.Code 790.03
.... "); Farmer's Union Cent. Exch. Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 626 F. Supp. at 590
("Chapter 26.1-04 [of the North Dakota Insurance Code] does not, by its express
terms, recognize a duty giving rise to an action for damages to one who is injured by
an insurer's unfair claim settlement practices.").
87. 754 P.2d 502 (Mont. 1988).
88. 1& at 504 (citing Mor. CODE ANN. § 33-1-201(6) (1993) (which defines an
'insurer' as including every person engaged as an indemnitor, surety, or contractor in
the business of entering into contracts of insurance"); MorT. CODE ANN. § 33-1-
201(5) (1993) (which "defines 'insurance' as a contract whereby one undertakes to
indemnify another or to pay or provide a specified or determinable amount or bene-
fit upon determinable contingencies"); and MoNT. CODE ANN. § 33-1-211 (1993)
(which "defines 'surety insurance' as including insurance guaranteeing the perform-
ance of contracts, other than insurance policies, and guaranteeing and executing
bonds, undertakings, and contracts of suretyship.")).
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Once we determine that an insurer issuing a surety bond is
transacting the business of insurance in Montana, the remain-
der of our decision in this cause is predictable. Every insurer
in Montana has an implied-in-law duty to act fairly and in
good faith in handling a claim under a contract issued by the
insurer....
It follows therefore that if a surety, transacting the business
of insurance, violates the provisions of § 33-18-201, MCA, the
claimant, in addition to his or her contract remedies, may be
compensated under tort law.89
The Supreme Courts of Arizona and North Dakota have adopted a
similar approach.90
Such an apples and oranges approach, mixing bits and pieces of
the insurance code with the common law, exceeds the proper role of
the judiciary. To the extent the legislature has defined suretyship as
insurance for purposes of the code, the ramifications of that choice,
including any expansion of the surety's traditional common law lia-
bility, should be limited to the express provisions of that code.
91
"Allowing, in addition, an independent tort action.. . 'might well
thwart the legislature's intent to craft a comprehensive insurance
code, and could subject [sureties] to multiple and inconsistent
liability.' 992
89. Id. at 505 (citing Klaudt v. Flink, 658 P.2d 1065 (Mont. 1983)). It is notewor-
thy that, under Montana law, "breach of the applicable provisions of [the insurance
code], § 33-18-201, MCA, by an insurer is conduct compensable in tort as to third
parties to the insurance contract." Id. (emphasis added) (citing Klaudt v. Flink, 658
P.2d 1065 (Mont. 1983)). That holding sets Montana apart from jurisdictions that
recognize an insurer's duty of good faith only to its first-party insured and not to
third-party claimants. The K-W Industries court expressly relied on that Montana
precedent concerning third-party claims in finding a duty of good faith by the surety
to the payment bond obligee. Id.
90. See Dodge v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 778 P.2d at 1241-44; Szar-
kowski v. Reliance Ins. Co., 404 N.W.2d at 504-05.
91. There are reasons for including sureties as "insurers" regulated under the
state insurance code other than to expand their potential liability in private civil
actions. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, §§ 3101-3105 (%Vest 1990 & Supp. 1994-
1995) (specifically regulating "surety insurance contracts"). It should be the legisla-
ture that decides the scope and effect of its decision to subject sureties to such
regulation.
92. Marquis v. Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co., 628 A.2d at 652 (quoting Seabury
Hous. Assocs. v. Home Ins. Co., 695 F. Supp. at 1249). See also Tudor Dev. Group,
Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 692 F. Supp. 461,465-66 (M.D. Pa. 1988)
(no cause of action under Pennsylvania law for breach of the implied duty of good
faith and fair dealing against surety where Pennsylvania Insurance Code "provided
an adequate deterrence against bad faith conduct . . ."); United States ex reL
Ehmcke Sheet Metal Works v. Wausau Ins. Cos., 755 F. Supp. at 910-11 (citing
Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 758 P.2d 58 (Cal. 1988) (where there is a
"regulatory scheme" already in place, "no additional private remedy [is]
required")).
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C. Third-Party Beneficiary Analysis
At least two of the courts imposing on the surety a duty of good
faith to the payment bond claimant, the Supreme Court of Alaska in
Loyal Order of Moose, Lodge 1392 v. International Fidelity Insur-
ance Co.,93 and the Supreme Court of North Dakota in Szarkowski
v. Reliance Insurance Co.,94 have attempted to address the lack of
privity between the surety and the obligee.95 Their answer: the ob-
ligee's status as a third-party beneficiary of the bond.96 These courts
found the obligee's third-party beneficiary relationship with the
surety "substantially identical" to the first-party insurance relation-
ships giving rise to a duty of good faith in the areas of liability and
casualty insurance under their prior decisions. 7
The obligee has long been recognized as an intended beneficiary
of the surety's bond.98 It is without question, however, a third-party
and not a first-party relationship.'
The conclusion by the Szarkowski and Moose Lodge courts that
this relationship is "substantially identical" to a first-party insurance
relationship is in both cases baldly stated, and in fact does great vio-
lence to the true nature of suretyship. Judicial opinions giving the
issue more careful consideration have reached the opposite
conclusion.'0o
The fact remains that there is no contract of any nature between
the surety and the payment bond obligee. The foundation from
which the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implied is there-
fore absent.' 0 '
93. 797 P.2d 622 (Alaska 1990).
94. 404 N.W.2d 502 (N.D. 1987).
95. Loyal Order of Moose, Lodge 1392 v. International Fidelity Ins. Co., 797 P.2d
at 628; Szarkowski v. Reliance Ins. Co., 404 N.W.2d at 505-06.
96. Loyal Order of Moose, Lodge 1392 v. International Fidelity Ins. Co., 797 P.2d
at 628; Szarkowski v. Reliance Ins. Co., 404 N.W.2d at 505-06.
97. Loyal Order of Moose, Lodge 1392 v. International Fidelity Ins. Co., 797 P.2d
at 628 ("In our view the relationship of a surety to its obligee-an intended creditor
third-party beneficiary-is more analogous to that of an insurer to its insured than
to the relationship between an insurer and an incidental third-party beneficiary.");
Szarkowski v. Reliance Ins. Co., 404 N.W.2d at 505 ("As an intended claimant [the
obligee] stands in a substantially identical relationship with [the surety] as did the
insured claimants with the insurers in [our prior decisions].").
98. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF SECURITY § 165 (1941).
99. IcL See also United States ex rel Ehmcke Sheet Metal Works v. Wausau Ins.
Cos., 755 F. Supp. at 913.
100. See United States ex rel. Ehmcke Sheet Metal Works v. Wausau Ins. Cos.,
755 F. Supp. at 913; Blakeslee Arpaia Chapman, Inc. v. United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co., No. 520348, 1994 WL 76383, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 4, 1994); Suver
v. Personal Serv. Ins. Co., 462 N.E.2d at 418 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
101. See United States ex rel. Ehmcke Sheet Metal Works v. Wausau Ins. Cos.,
755 F. Supp. at 912 ("[T]he California courts repeatedly have stressed that the cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing arises from a contractual relationship and is lim-
ited to the parties in that relationship."); Suver v. Personal Serv. Ins. Co., 462 N.E.2d
[Vol. 47:389
1995] THE SURETY'S LIABILITY FOR "BAD FAITH" 407
Fmally, by definition, a third-party beneficiary may profit only to
the extent there is a "clear and definite" expression of intent to that
effect in the contract or the circumstances under which it was exe-
cuted.1"2 Such a party therefore cannot claim the benefit of any im-
plied covenant.
D. Miller Act Preemption
Under the Miller Act:10 3
Before any contract, exceeding $25,000 in amount, for the con-
struction, alteration, or repair of any public building or public
work of the United States is awarded to any person, such per-
son shall furnish to the United States... a payment bond ...
for the protection of all persons supplying labor and material
in the prosecution of the work provided for in said contract for
the use of each such person.'
"The rights afforded by the Act are limited ... by the proviso of
§ 270b(a),"1 5 which provides only that the payment bond obligee:
shall have the right to sue on such payment bond for the
amount, or the balance thereof, unpaid [for labor or material
furnished by him in the prosecution of the work] at the time of
institution of such suit and to prosecute said action to final
execution and judgment for the sum or sums justly due him
106
The few courts that have explicitly considered whether the Miller
Act preempts state law claims for bad faith against the surety have
split on this issue.
In K-W Industries v. National Surety Corp.,107 the Ninth Circuit
held that the Miller Act does not preempt independent claims "aris-
at 418 (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[T]he contractual relationship between the parties
[is] vital in establishing the duty on the insurer to act in good faith."). See also
Linscott v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 368 A.2d at 1163 (Me. 1977) ("A 'duty of
good faith and fair dealing' in the handling of claims runs only to an insurance com-
pany's insured," and "it derives from a covenant implicit in the provisions of the
insurance contract....") (citations omitted); Marquis v. Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co..
628 A.2d at 648 ("The duty to act in good faith arises at the time the parties enter
into the insurance contract ....").
It was on this point that the California Supreme Court overruled the seminal deci-
sion of Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 592 P.2d 329 (Cal. 1979) in Moradi-
Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 758 P.2d 58 (Cal. 1988), based on nine years of
adverse consequences from extending the duty of good faith to third-party claimants
as analogous to the first-party insurance relationship. See generally United States ex
reL Ehmcke Sheet Metal Works v. Wausau Ins. Cos., 755 F. Supp. at 910.
102. F.O. Bailey Co. v. Ledgewood, Inc., 603 A.2d 466, 468 (Me. 1992).
103. 40 U.S.C. §§ 270a-270f (1988).
104. Id. § 270a(a)(2).
105. F. D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 122
(1974).
106. 40 U.S.C. § 270b(a) (1988).
107. 855 F.2d 640 (9th Cir. 1988).
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ing" under state law, such as the tort claim before it for bad faith
under the Montana unfair insurance practices law.108 The K-W In-
dustries court noted that the case before it was "in federal court
solely on the basis of diversity jurisdiction," and not under "the
Miller Act or any other federal statute.""° The court concluded
that "the Congressional purpose of protecting suppliers of goods
and services for federal projects is advanced if sureties are deterred
by state tort law from bad faith practices in responding to claims on
Miller Act payment bonds."" 0
Opposite K-W Industries is the subsequent decision of the West-
ern District of Louisiana in United States ex rel. Pensacola Construc-
tion Co. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co."' Citing the
United States Supreme Court decision in F. D. Rich Co. v. United
States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co.112 and its progeny, including the
Ninth Circuit decision of United States ex rel. Aurora Painting, Inc. v.
Fireman's Fund Insurance Co.," 3 the Pensacola court flatly stated:
"The K-W court is wrong in its interpretation of the Miller Act-
both as to its purpose and as to its pre-emptive sweep."" 4 The
court noted that the Miller Act was "designed to protect the surety"
as well as the payment bond obligees. 15 The Pensacola court con-
cluded: "It would be illogical for Congress to give exclusive jurisdic-
tion over the Miller Act to federal courts and then expect them to
follow state law in interpreting it. 16
The balance in this duel is tipped in favor of preemption by a
closer examination of the Supreme Court's F. D. Rich decision and
108. Id. at 643. In United States ex reL Ehmcke Sheet Metal Works v. Wausau
Ins. Cos., 755 F. Supp. 906 (E.D. Cal. 1991), the Eastern District of California felt
compelled to follow suit in the face of this holding by the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 908-
09. The district court's heart clearly was not in the result. Id. at 911 ("If additional
remedies are required to fulfill federal purposes such remedies should be by act of
Congress and not by individual state courts.").
109. K-W Indus. v. National Sur. Corp., 855 F.2d at 643.
110. Id.
111. 710 F. Supp. 638 (W.D. La. 1989).
112. 417 U.S. 117 (1974).
113. 832 F.2d 1150 (9th Cir. 1987).
114. United States ex reL Pensacola Constr. Co. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins.
Co., 710 F. Supp. at 640.
115. Id. at 639 (citing United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Hendry Corp., 391
F.2d 13 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 978 (1968)).
116. Id. at 640. See also United States ex rel Gen. Elec. Supply Co. v. Minority
Elec. Co., 537 F. Supp. 1018, 1019-21 (S.D. Ga. 1982) (citing F. D. Rich and its
progeny and rejecting the plaintiff's attempt to assert a state law claim "for attor-
ney's fees and a bad faith penalty of twenty-five percent of the amount owed as
provided by Georgia Code Annotated § 103-210" as part of a Miller Act action).
The General Electric court found it unnecessary to answer whether such a state law
claim can be brought under pendent or supplemental jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367 (Supp. I 1991), because the plaintiff had failed to plead a separate "state
cause of action over which pendent jurisdiction can be exercised." United States ex
reL Gen. Elec. Supply Co. v. Minority Elec. Co., 537 F. Supp. at 1021.
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by the undesirable proliferation of multi-forum litigation observed
in the K-W Industries case itself.
In F. D. Rich, the Supreme Court stated:
The Miller Act provides a federal cause of action, and the
scope of the remedy as well as the substance of the rights cre-
ated thereby are matters of federal, not state law. Neither re-
spondent nor the court below offers any evidence of
congressional intent to incorporate state law to govern such an
important element of Miller Act litigation as liability for attor-
neys' fees. Many federal contracts involve construction in
more than one State, and often, as here, the parties to Miller
Act litigation have little or no contact, other than the contract
itself, with the State in which the federal project is located.
The reasonable expectations of such potential litigants are bet-
ter served by a rule of uniform national application.' 1 7
In K-W Industries, the Ninth Circuit attempted to distinguish F. D.
Rich,"' but in the face of such explicit language from the Supreme
Court on the desirability of a uniform remedy for Miller Act pay-
ment bond obligees, those efforts are hard to swallow."'
The tortured history of litigation in two separate forums in K-W
Industries provides perhaps the best practical illustration of the
flaws in that decision. 20 As the Ninth Circuit pointed out, "K-W's
earlier federal court suit against National for payment on the Miller
Act bond has long since been settled." '' The case appeared in fed-
eral court again after the plaintiff filed a second action against the
surety in state court; the surety then removed the case to federal
district court, which dismissed the case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction; the Ninth Circuit, on appeal from that decision, sent the
case back to state court on certification of "two threshold questions
117. F. D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. at 127.
118. K-W Indus. v. National Sur. Corp., 855 F.2d at 643 (distinguishing on ground
that a state law bad faith claim does not arise under Miller Act or other federal
statute).
119. E D. Rich did recognize the Miller Act surety's exposure for attorneys' fees
in a case where the surety "has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for
oppressive reasons." F. D. Rich Co. v. United States ex reL Indus. Lumber Co., 417
U.S. at 129. Such exposure is not pursuant to any state law bad faith remedy but
rather is pursuant to a "long recognized" federal common law exception to the
"American Rule" that each litigant shall bear his own legal fees. Ld. Ibis exception
to the American Rule applies to any federal court litigant, not just sureties and in-
surers. Presumably, the conduct giving rise to such a claim would have to occur
during the course of the litigation and be quite extreme, something more than, for
instance, mere delay or refusal of a payment bond claim.
120. See United States ex rel Ehmcke Sheet Metal Works v. Wausau Ins. Cos..
755 F. Supp. at 910 ("[It appears that [the bad faith] cause of action might create
multiple lawsuits, with the subcontractor first suing in the federal court on the bond
and then suing in state court for breach of the covenant of good faith. In K-W
Industries v. National Sur. Corp., 855 F.2d 640, this is precisely what happened.").
121. K-W Indus. v. National Sur. Corp., 855 F.2d at 643.
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of state law to the Montana Supreme Court for decision"; the case
then returned to the Ninth Circuit for decision of the preemption
issue; after which the Ninth Circuit remanded to the federal district
court for determination of the plaintiff's state law cause of action. 122
In summary, "[i]f additional remedies are required to fulfill fed-
eral purposes such remedies should be by act of Congress and not
by individual state courts.' 123 The sounder view is that the Miller
Act preempts state law claims for bad faith against a surety issuing a
payment bond pursuant to that federal statute's requirements.
V. THE LIKELY RESULT FOR THE PAYMENT BOND
SURETY IN MAINE
As noted above, the payment bond surety's liability to its obligee
for bad faith is an issue of first impression in Maine. Neither the
Maine Law Court nor the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Maine has yet passed on that specific question in a reported
decision.
A review of relevant Maine statutes and case law in the context of
decisions from other jurisdictions that have considered the issue,
however, yields an irresistible conclusion: no such cause of action
exists in Maine, by statute or at common law.
With respect to a statutory claim, the proper point of reference is
Maine's Insurance Code, Title 24-A of the Maine Revised Statutes
Annotated.
Section 3 defines "insurance" as "a contract whereby one under-
takes to pay or indemnify another as to loss from certain specified
contingencies or perils, or to pay or grant a specified amount or de-
terminable benefit or annuity in connection with ascertainable risk
contingencies, or to act as surety.' 24 Section 4 defines "insurer" to
include "every person engaged as principal and as indemnitor,
surety or contractor in the business of entering into contracts of
insurance."' 1 5
Chapter 43 of Title 24-A applies specifically to "surety insurance
contracts.' 26 Under section 3101, "[a]ll contracts of surety insur-
ance delivered or issued for delivery in this State and covering sub-
jects resident, located, or to be performed in this State are also
subject to the applicable provisions of chapter 27 (the insurance
contract) and to other applicable provisions of this Title."' 127 Chap-
122. 1& at 641-44.
123. United States ex reL Ehmcke Sheet Metal Works v. Wausau Ins. Cos., 755 F.
Supp. at 911.
124. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 3 (West 1990) (emphasis added).
125. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 4 (West 1990) (emphasis added).
126. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, §§ 3101-3105 (West 1990 & Supp. 1994-
1995).
127. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 3101 (West 1990).
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ter 27 includes both the "late payment"'12 and the "unfair claims
practices"' 29 provisions of the Code, permitting recovery of penal
interest and attorneys' fees.13"
The key to this entire statutory scheme is the word "applicable" in
section 3101. There can be no doubt that a surety is an "insurer"
subject to the Maine Insurance Code. By their explicit terms, how-
ever, not all the provisions of the Code outside chapter 43 131 in-
cluding sections 2436 and 2436-A of chapter 27-are "applicable" to
sureties and claims against them by their obligees.
To the contrary, the specific language of both section 2436"- and
section 2436-A, 33 discussed above,"M makes it clear that they apply
only to a first-party claim by an "insured" against "his own in-
surer.' 35 Because these provisions are penal in nature, they must
be strictly construed.'" They are therefore not "applicable" to the
third-party relationship between the surety and the payment bond
obligee, and provide no cause of action against the surety on the
obligee's claim against the payment bond.
With respect to a common law claim, the limitations imposed by
Maine law are equally clear." "Tlhere is no general implied duty
of good faith under Maine law that operates beyond the scope of the
mandate of the Maine U.C.C. and the contractual relationship be-
tween an insurer and its insured on a policy of casualty
insurance.""3
The Law Court has expressly rebuffed efforts to extend that duty
to the third-party relationship between a liability carrier and a tort
claimant.13 9 The Law Court relied on the fact that the essence of
the relationship between those two parties is "adversary in
nature. '
, 4 o
That fact sets Maine apart from other jurisdictions that have
found the payment bond surety liable for bad faith based on a com-
128. Mn. Rnv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2436 (West 1990).
129. Mn. REav. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2436-A (West 1990).
130. See supra notes 35-54 and accompanying text.
131. Mn. Rnv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, §§ 3101-3105 (West 1990 & Supp. 1994-
1995).
132. See supra note 37.
133. See supra note 47.
134. See supra notes 35-54 and accompanying text.
135. Mn. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2436-A (West 1990). Although the -his
own insurer" language is found only in section 2436-A, the legislative history and
the Law Court's construction of section 2436 make clear that it too applies only to
first-party insurance claims. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 22-33 and accompanying text.
138. Renaissance Yacht Co. v. Stenbeck, 818 F. Supp. at 412. See supra notes 22-
29 and accompanying text.
139. Linscott v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 368 A.2d at 1163-64.
140. Id. at 1163.
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mon law or statutory scheme that recognizes a third-party tort
claimant's cause of action for bad faith.14 1 The common law and
statutes of Maine are plainly to the contrary.
Maine is also unlikely to agree with those jurisdictions that con-
sider the relationship between surety and payment bond claimant
"substantially identical" to the first-party insurance relationship.142
It is a third-party relationship, 14 3 which in fact more closely resem-
bles the adversarial relationship between the liability insurer and the
third-party tort claimant. The approach of those other jurisdictions
is inconsistent with the stringent boundaries set in Maine for appli-
cation of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. Maine law simply
does not leave room to recognize a duty of good faith by a surety to
a payment bond obligee.
Finally, it is expected that the District of Maine and the First Cir-
cuit will recognize that the Miller Act preempts any state law bad
faith claim on payment bonds to which that statute applies.' 44 Of
course, in Maine there does not appear to be any such claim to
preempt.
VI. CONCLUSION
Where did Antonio's duty of good faith lie, to his good friend and
principal Bassanio, or also to his obligee Shylock? 145 As surety,
should Antonio have been liable for bad faith for contesting the for-
feit of his bond, "an equal pound Of [his] fair flesh"? 146
Although Shakespeare's tale of suretyship in sixteenth century
Venice does not provide a totally apt analogy to the modem day
payment bond relationship, it is not totally inapt either. The interac-
tion between surety and payment bond obligee, which arises only in
the event of a claim, clearly is "adversary in nature.' 47
Careful examination of current Maine law in the area of bad faith
demonstrates that it has no application to the relationship between
the surety and the payment bond claimant. That is the proper re-
141. See, e.g., K-W Indus. v. National Sur. Corp., 754 P.2d at 504-05 (citing
Klaudt v. Flink, 658 P.2d 1065 (Mont. 1983)); General Ins. Co. of America v. Mam-
moth Vista Owners Ass'n, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 296-97, 300 (citing Royal Globe Ins. Co.
v. Superior Court, 592 P.2d 329 (Cal. 1979)).
142. See, e.g., Szarkowski v. Reliance Ins. Co., 404 N.W.2d at 505; Loyal Order of
Moose, Lodge 1392 v. International Fidelity Ins. Co., 797 P.2d at 628.
143. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF SEcuRIrrY § 165 (1941). Even those de-
cisions suggesting the false analogy to a first-party insurance relationship concede
that the payment bond obligee is a "third-party beneficiary" of the bond. See Szar-
kowski v. Reliance Ins. Co., 404 N.W.2d at 505; Loyal Order of Moose, Lodge 1392
v. International Fidelity Ins. Co., 797 P.2d at 628.
144. See supra notes 103-23 and accompanying text.
145. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE (Harvard Univ. Press
1955) (7th ed. 1598).
146. Id. at act I, sc. 3, lines 145-46.
147. Linscott v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 368 A.2d at 1163.
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suit. A surety should not be intimidated or coerced into payment of
a claim by the fact that its decision to contest the claim, in all likeli-
hood at the urging of its principal, could result in liability to that
claimant grossly in excess of the exposure the surety agreed to carry
by contract with its principal, the penal sum of its bond. The surety
should have its day in court on claims by third parties against the
bond without fear of forfeiting a pound of its flesh as well as its
penal sum.

